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Introduction
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has undergone many changes in 
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terms of its identity as a pacifistic provision and as the representation of the 
public will.1 It is known as the law, along with the preamble, that gives the 
Japanese Constitution its peace-oriented character.2
On September 19, 2015, the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(“LDP”), and its party leader and current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed 
two bills through the Upper House of the Japanese National Diet to 
implement a reinterpreted version of Article 9, which would effectively allow 
collective self-defense.3 The two bills would amend ten currently existing 
security laws and give legal authority to the Japanese government to deploy 
the Self-Defense Force (“SDF”) abroad.4  In effect, Japan would repossess 
the ability to use force as an instrument of state policy; specifically, it could 
provide armed and logistical support to close allies who are threatened when 
Japan is clearly threatened as well.5
In this Note, I argue that although the recent legislation is consistent with 
SDF deregulation patterns since the 1990s, both bills are inconsistent with 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, despite the cabinet’s reinterpretation 
of Article 9 in 2014.6 Furthermore, I assert that the legislation will likely lead 
to destabilizing effects in East Asia.7
First, I argue that the recently passed bills, which implement Abe’s 
reinterpreted version of Article 9 by allowing the use of military force in 
international disputes even when the disputes are indirectly related to Japan, 
are unconstitutional because of democratic principle and prior interpretations 
of Article 9. Article 9 was traditionally interpreted to limit the Japanese 
government from resolving international disputes with military force, 
regardless of a dispute’s relation to Japan.8 If articles within the Japanese 
Constitution are malleable to the extent that any law can easily be 
reinterpreted to advance convenience or a political agenda, the principles of 
1. See Matt Ford, Japan Curtails Its Pacifist Stance, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/japan-pacifism-article-nine/
406318/ [https://perma.cc/W5HF-ZHEG].
2. See id.; Norihiro Kato, Japan’s Break with Peace, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/opinion/norihiro-kato-japans-break-with-
peace.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VK4M-VV3X].
3. Rupakjyoti Borah, Japan’s Controversial Security Bills Pass in the Upper House. 
Now What?, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 19, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-
controversial-security-bills-pass-in-the-upper-house-now-what/ [https://perma.cc/N7QK-
364F].
4. Craig Martin, Media Should Stop Legitimizing Abe’s Article 9 ‘Reinterpretation’,
JAPAN TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/12/
commentary/japan-commentary/media-stop-legitimizing-abes-article-9-reinterpretation/
#.WI_TdxiZN0x [https://perma.cc/WNA3-HJGV].
5. Ford, supra note 1.
6. See Nancy Snow, The Abe Administration’s Arrogance of Power Moment, JAPAN 
TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/07/16/commentary/
japan-commentary/abe-administrations-arrogance-power-moment/#.ViSJ12SrSfU
[https://perma.cc/8KMF-PD97].
7. Borah, supra note 3.
8. Ford, supra note 1.
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constitutionalism and the rule of law will be undermined.9 Thus, prior 
interpretation of Article 9 by previous administrations and the Japanese 
Supreme Court suggests that stare decisis should be respected.10 In addition, 
Japan is a liberal-democratic order with a representative government.  A poll 
in 2015 found that 61% of Japanese respondents opposed the passage of these 
bills in the lower house.11 Notwithstanding this opposition, the political body 
passed the legislation.12 Thus, if the polls reflect an accurate depiction of the 
Japanese sentiment, it seems that the Diet is acting antithetically to 
democratic principles.
Lastly, I argue that the bills may have destabilizing effects upon East 
Asia.13 A militarized Japan will justify increases in military expenditure to 
provide for security against threatening countries and provoke instability 
within the East-Asian region.14 Moreover, Japanese conservatives are 
indifferent to the bitter, historical residue of World War II; the weight of such 
history is not recognized as sufficiently relevant in decisions that implicate 
the security of other nations.15 Thus, if Japan obtains the capability to go to 
war, fueled by their fear and nationalism, there may be backlash from other 
countries.16  War may not be the outcome, but regional destabilization and 
weakened regional economic integration may occur.
I. Legal and Historical Background
A. Brief History of Article 9
Since 1947, Japan has been constitutionally prohibited from declaring or 
fighting in a war due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.17 Paragraph 
one of Article 9 states that the “Japanese people forever renounce war” and 
the “threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes[,]” 
9. C.M. Rubin, Japanese Scholars Say No to War, HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-m-rubin/japanese-scholars-say-no_b_
7776418.html [https://perma.cc/9FJS-7WHY].
10. See discussion infra Part II(b)(ii).
11. Masaaki Kameda, Protesters Decry Passage of ‘War Legislation’ by Lower 
House Committee, JAPAN TIMES (July 15, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/
07/15/national/outside-diet-protesters-decry-passage-defense-bills-lower-house-
committee/#.VdpTx7xVhrU [https://perma.cc/EZ85-QL2S].
12. See Borah, supra note 3.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See Shaun O’Dwyer, It’s Time for Conservatives of Japan to Get Over the War,
JAPAN TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/30/
commentary/japan-commentary/its-time-for-conservatives-of-japan-to-get-over-the-war/
#.WLc4HWQrK8U [https://perma.cc/9A5J-W2UY]; Masaru Tamamoto, Fellow, World 
Policy Institute, U.S.-Japan  Relations, C-SPAN (Nov. 24, 2003), http://www.c-span.org/
video/?179251-1/usjapan-relations [https://perma.cc/AY64-R7TA] [hereinafter Tamamoto, 
U.S.-Japan Relations]. 
16. See Borah, supra note 3.
17. See Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS, http://
afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_usjapan.htm [https://perma.cc/TVD9-G3ZW]
(last visited Feb. 21 2017) [hereinafter Article 9].
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while paragraph two states that “war potential will never be maintained.”18
Notwithstanding this, and the Japanese reluctance to rearm, the Japanese 
repossessed instruments of war, such as machine guns and eventually heavy 
artillery, due to the Korean War and rising communist influence in East 
Asia.19
Since U.S. troops stationed in Japan were moved to Korea, despite the 
important role fighting communism and preserving American influence in 
Japan, Japan complied with the U.S. request to create and maintain a Japanese 
police force for self-defense, named the Self-Defense Force (“SDF”).20 Japan 
reconciled this potential contradiction of maintaining armed forces with 
Article 9’s second paragraph by identifying the SDF as a force without 
military potential in the modern era.21 Thus, Japan was able to escape 
constitutional reinterpretation by classifying its armed forces as militarily 
impotent.22 Since the 1990s, SDF restrictions have continually loosened.23
In 2014, in furtherance of SDF deregulation, Prime Minister Abe and his 
cabinet reinterpreted Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense and 
recently passed legislation that would implement such reinterpretation.24
Moreover, the United States has continually encouraged Japan to revise 
Article 9 and rearm due to rising security concerns in Asia in the latter half 
of the 20th century, such as in Korea, China, and Vietnam.25
B. Legal Implications upon Article 9
In the past decade, Japanese conservatives argued that Japan should 
become a “normal” state, meaning that Japan should repossess the right to 
maintain a military and provide armed support to its allies.26 The Upper 
House of the Diet recently passed legislation that allows the SDF to provide 
armed support to its allies, such as being able to shoot down a North Korean 
missile targeted at the United States if Japan or her people are clearly 
threatened.27 Although the first paragraph of Article 9 was historically 
interpreted to limit SDF capabilities from using military force in support of 
its allies, the recently passed legislation will implement Abe’s reinterpreted 
Article 9 to effectively allow collective self-defense, or armed and logistical
support to its close allies, as long as the dispute is not directly related to 
Japan.28 Thus, the Japanese SDF will be able to give armed support to close 
18. Id.; NIHONKOKU KENPƿ[K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan).
19. Article 9, supra note 17; Sayuri Umeda, Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution,
LIBR. CONGRESS (Feb. 2006), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/
article9.php#_ [https://perma.cc/5HF6-YT4C].
20. See Umeda, supra note 19.
21. See id.
22. Id. 
23. See generally id. 
24. See Ford, supra note 1.
25. See Umeda, supra note 19.
26. See Snow, supra note 6; Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
27. Ford, supra note 1.
28. Id. 
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allies under the condition that Japan is clearly threatened, but will continue to 
be disabled in declaring war or striking offensively when the dispute is 
directly related to Japan.29
C. Brief History of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty
The U.S.–Japan Security Treaty was first signed in 1951 and was 
amended in 1960.30 After Japan regained its sovereignty, the United States 
created the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in order to maintain U.S. influence 
and ensure stability within East Asia.31 In exchange for allowing continual 
presence of U.S. bases in Japan, Japan received U.S. military support.32 This 
alliance helped Japan maintain its pacifist constitution.33 However, the 
alliance has become a reason for revision of Article 9.34 Japanese 
conservatives in the past decade have not only argued that Article 9 must be 
revised in order to establish a “normal” state, but have asserted that the Treaty 
is unfair towards the United States because Japan is free-riding in terms of 
regional security.35 Many conservatives believe that Japan is not providing 
the same amount of protection as the U.S. regional protection due to the 
limitations imposed by Article 9, such as the restriction on collective self-
defense.36 Japanese conservatives see this limitation as a potential 
justification for future U.S. abandonment of Japanese security.37 Moreover, 
according to Sayuri Umeda, Japan had the right to collective self-defense 
through the 1960 revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, but was unable 
to exercise this right because of the restriction against collective self-defense 
enshrined in Article 9.38
D. Implications upon the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty
The recent legislation passed in the Upper House will effectively 
reinterpret Article 9 by enabling Japan to give armed and logistical support 
to allies who are threatened, satisfying current security demands from 
conservatives who believe that the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty is 
unbalanced.39 The United States would welcome the reinterpretation and 
allocate expanded roles to the SDF in performing a wider range of functions 
29. Id. 
30. Umeda, supra note 19.
31. Id.; Article 9, supra note 17.
32. See Umeda, supra note 19.
33. See Masaru Tamamoto, Fellow, World Policy Institute, Post-Containment 
Stability in the Pacific, C-SPAN (July 17, 1991), http://www.c-span.org/video/?19330-1/
postcontainment-stability-pacific [https://perma.cc/3TWN-K92Y] [hereinafter Tamamoto, 
Post Containment]. 
34. See generally Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
35. See id.
36. See id.; Nassrine Azimi, Flexing the Wrong Muscle, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/opinion/japan-is-flexing-the-wrong-
muscles.html [https://perma.cc/VV2W-Y3YE]; Ford, supra note 1.
37. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
38. See Umeda, supra note 19.
39. See Ford, supra note 1.
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in the U.S.-run joint security operation, or Pax Americana, in the Pacific.40
Also, authorizing armed support outside of Japan is significant because the 
Japanese government could no longer avoid U.S. requests to join wars by 
citing an Article 9 violation as justification.41
Furthermore, the idea of rebalancing security concerns within the U.S.–
Japan Security Treaty is manifested in the Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense 
Cooperation (“The Guidelines”).  The Guidelines were an attempt by both 
nations to set a structure for emergency defense of Japan and other related 
security concerns while staying consistent with the fundaments of the U.S.–
Japan Security Treaty.42  As such, the Guidelines establish a framework of 
how to achieve the policy objectives and obligations enumerated in the U.S.–
Japan Security Treaty.43 Recently, in 2015, the Guidelines were modified to 
adapt to new and changing regional security circumstances because of the 
reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense.44 This 
modification is important because SDF troops will likely play a more 
significant role in Pax Americana regional security.45
II. Analysis
The passing of this legislation to implement changes reflected from the 
Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is 
unconstitutional for two primary reasons: 1) democratic principle and 2) prior 
interpretation of Article 9.  After challenging the constitutionality of the 
legislation, we will examine potential consequences of enacting the 
legislation within the East-Asian regional context.
40. Borah, supra note 3; see Harvery M. Sapolsky, Managing Global Security Beyond 
‘Pax Americana’, E-INT’L REL. (Jan. 21, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/21/
managing-global-security-beyond-pax-americana/ [https://perma.cc/TD9H-4G3Q].
41. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15. Although the Japanese 
Government gave authorization to the SDF for collective self-defense, the government 
may still reject the U.S. request to join their war if the government fails to identify the 
dispute affecting their close allies as a clear threat to Japan and/or her people, the 
government identifies the dispute as directly related to Japan, or the dispute is not directly 
related to close allies.  In addition, the government must have no appropriate alternative 
method to deal with the dispute other than military combat.  All the conditions are subject 
to potential leeway, however, because there is no clear and formal example to anchor the 
meaning of each condition.  Moreover, the conditions that the government must meet in 
order to exercise their right to collective self-defense demonstrates its openness to abuse.  
See Sachiko Miwa, INSIGHT: Conditions for Exercising Right to Collective Self-defense 
Open to Interpretation, ASAHI SHIMBUN (May 12, 2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/
behind_news/politics/AJ201505120059 [https://perma.cc/7ZJ7-548Q]; Umeda, supra
note 19.
42. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/
us/security/guideline2.html [https://perma.cc/7UEA-85CP] (last visited Feb. 21 2017).
43. See id.
44. See Robin Sakoda, The 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: End of a New 
Beginning, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Apr. 30, 2015), http://amti.csis.org/
the-2015-u-s-japan-defense-guidelines-end-of-a-new-beginning/ [https://perma.cc/
8LRY-8S6Y].
45. See id. 
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A. Democratic Principle
1. Tyrannical Use of Executive Power
When Prime Minister Abe was unable to secure a constitutional 
amendment to reinterpret Article 9 in 2013, he decided to use the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau (“CLB”) as a political chess-piece of the executive.46
According to Sayuri Umeda, although the Japanese Supreme Court gave 
deference to the CLB for constitutional and legislative interpretation, which 
made the CLB seem vulnerable to political interest, the CLB was surprisingly 
well insulated from political pressures in the past.47 The CLB has been seen 
as an effective institution; almost all legal disputes brought to the Japanese 
Supreme Court regarding interpretation issues ruled in favor of the CLB.48
Prime Minister Abe, however, decided to use this institution as a method to 
achieve his policy objective.49
Prime Minister Abe first fired the Director-General of the CLB, 
Tsuneyuki Yamamoto, and put Ichiro Komatsu in his place in 2013.50
Komatsu was evidently in favor of Abe’s policy objectives and expressed the 
view that decisions made by the CLB must align with the interests of the 
Prime Minister’s cabinet members.51 When Komatsu had to step down 
because of health issues, he was replaced with Yusuke Yokobatake.52
Yokobatake was also in alignment with Komatsu’s views.  With the CLB 
under the control of the Prime Minister, the CLB rendered a decision in July 
2014 that reinterpreted Article 9 to include collective self-defense.53 The 
decision broadened the scope of what fell under self-defense rather than 
expressly allowing collective self-defense.54 This side-step was done partly 
46. See Umeda, supra note 19.  Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds 
supermajority vote instead of a regular majority vote for statutes and other legislation.  
Prime Minister Abe was unable to secure this supermajority and thus attempted an easier, 
but less democratic, route towards constitutional reinterpretation.  In other words, the 
Prime Minister reinterpreted the constitution instead of amending it.  See Mari Yamaguchi, 
Japan Split over Revision to Pacifist Constitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(May 4, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/japan-split-over-revision-pacifist-
constitution [https://perma.cc/ZM5U-2FF4].
47. See Yamaguchi, supra note 46.
48. See id.
49. Jeremy A. Yellen, Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions, DIPLOMAT (June 12, 
2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/
[https://perma.cc/2FNS-RNUM].
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Reiji Yoshida, Abe’s Man in Cabinet Law Office Steps Down, JAPAN TIMES (May 
16, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/16/national/politics-
diplomacy/cabinet-law-office-shake-slow-abes-military-drive/#.Vlo7-2SrQ0o [https://
perma.cc/FJ8E-7TM6]; see Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Replaced Due to Ill Health,
ASAHI SHIMBUN (May 16, 2014), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/
AJ201405160029 [https://perma.cc/P79S-6KCU]. 
53. Masahiro Akiyama, Redefining Self-Defense, TOKYO FOUND. (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2014/redefining-self-defense [https://
perma.cc/7YX2-NLZ8].
54. Id. 
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because Prime Minister Abe wanted to escape the attention put upon the issue 
of collective self-defense—it was very unpopular from the views of both 
dissident politicians and the public majority.55 Pursuant to such agenda, the 
CLB was able to cloak the essence of collective self-defense by conditioning 
this right upon the existence of a sufficient threat to Japan and her people, 
attempting to reconcile the constitution and the reinterpretation of Article 9 
by making indirect relations to international disputes directly related.56
After the decision was rendered to reinterpret Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution to allow for collective self-defense, Prime Minister Abe took 
action to implement such interpretation through legislation.57 However, per 
professor and constitutional law scholar Yasuo Hasebe of Waseda University, 
the recently passed legislation, which expands the role and lessens restrictions 
on the SDF, are unconstitutional because both bills come from Prime Minister 
Abe’s authoritarian use of power.58 The CLB is the institution that provides 
government interpretation of the constitution and legislation; therefore, using 
it as an instrument of the executive after the executive was unable to persuade 
the public majority and political dissidents within the legislature to amend the 
constitution not only undermines the separation of powers between the 
executive and legislature, but also undermines the institution of democracy.59
Thus, such authoritarian use of power to reinterpret the Japanese Constitution, 
which gave rise to the recently passed legislation, should support the 
unconstitutionality of that legislation.
2. Lack of Transparency
The CLB, albeit responsibly producing “detailed records of the legal 
screenings” for past constitutional interpretation issues, has been critically 
opaque with its screening process for the Article 9 revision.  The CLB left no 
record of internal discussions, making it harder for the public to understand 
the CLB’s judgment in its reinterpretation of Article 9.60  Further, meeting 
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Borah, supra note 3; Bryce Wakefield, Abe’s Law: Domestic Dimensions of 
Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Debate 2 (Mar. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https:/
/www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WakefieldEssay.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9HS-
GAZN].
58. See Reiji Yoshida, Experts’ Tongue-Lashing Rekindles Diet Debate on 
Reinterpreted Constitution, JAPAN TIMES (June 5, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/06/05/national/politics-diplomacy/experts-blast-constitutional-
reinterpretation-lower-house-session/#.VloJx2SrQ0p [https://perma.cc/4GUM-VCHK].
59. See id.; Colin P.A. Jones, For ‘No War’ Article 9, Any Reinterpretation Will Do,
JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/11/20/
issues/for-no-war-article-9-any-reinterpretation-will-do/#.WLdAfmQrK8V [https://
perma.cc/3PKS-3VLK]; Watanabe Tetsuya, Triple Shot: Scholars Say Security 
Legislation ‘Unconstitutional’, ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 5, 2014), http://ajw.asahi.com/
article/behind_news/politics/AJ201506050040 [https://perma.cc/6PQR-D7PH].
60. Kyodo, Government Skipped Recording Debate over Constitutional 
Reinterpretation, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/
09/28/national/politics-diplomacy/government-skipped-recording-debate-over-
constitutional-reinterpretation/#.Vlo7NWSrQ0q [https://perma.cc/TH9G-8PGB].
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 82 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 82 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
KIM NOTE FORMATTED 6/28/2017 5:28 PM
2017 Reasons and Consequences 155
minutes were not recorded, undermining future investigations into the 
decision-making process by scholars and the public.61
In response, Atsushi Yushita, a lawyer on behalf of the CLB, claimed 
that there is no legal obligation for the CLB to record and publish meeting 
minutes.62 However, Masahiro Usaki, a constitutional law professor at 
Dokkyo University Law School, contends that the Public Records and 
Archives Management Law (“PRAML”) compels the production of 
documents vis-à-vis the decision-making process in an “administrative organ 
as well as the business performance of such organs” unless the matter is 
minor.63 In this case, Professor Usaki asserts that redefining the constitution 
is no minor matter.64 Thus, through its lack of transparency, the CLB may 
have contravened the PRAML during the decision-making process of the 
Article 9 reinterpretation.65 Furthermore, after the CLB rendered its decision 
in 2014, 85% of respondents in a poll believed that the government had not 
given a clear explanation about the right to collective self-defense, 
underscoring the lack of transparency.66
The recently passed legislation also raised concerns amongst the public 
regarding the lack of transparency.67  In May 2015, two months before the 
legislation passed in the lower house, a survey found that 81.4% of 
respondents believed that the government had not adequately explained the 
content of the legislation, in contrast to 14.2% that believed the explanation 
was sufficient.68 Such a lack of transparency in both the reinterpretation 
decision and the details of the legislation undermines the institution of 
democracy, and should support the unconstitutionality of the recently passed 
legislation.
3. Majority Will Against Abe’s Plan and Legislations
In addition to the ignoble origins and process of the reinterpretation’s 
legitimacy, Prime Minister Abe’s use of power contradicts the polled 
61. Katsuhisa Kuramae, Bureau Kept No Records on Discussing Reinterpretation of 
Constitution, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Nov. 24, 2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/
politics/AJ201511240050 [https://perma.cc/NL8R-NQ62].
62. See id. 
63. See id.
64. Id.; See Editorial: Abe’s Collective Self-defense Argument Just Got Shakier,
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Nov. 25, 2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/
AJ201511250043 [https://perma.cc/FBD6-KRLM].
65. See id. 
66. Matake Kamiya, Japanese Public Opinions about the Exercise of the Right of 
Collective Self-Defense, JAPAN FOREIGN POL’Y F. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://
www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/politics/pt20140925231907.html [https://perma.cc/
VE6P-K95M].
67. See Kyodo, Abe’s Security Bills Baffle 81% of the Public: Survey, JAPAN TIMES
(May 31, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/31/national/politics-
diplomacy/81-say-state-explanations-controversial-security-bills-insufficient-poll/
#.Vq_FdRgrLUo [https://perma.cc/A4BL-PWTR].
68. Id.; see Japan’s Lower House Approves Changes to Self-defense Law, BBC (July 
16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33546465 [https://perma.cc/7TFG-
ZKDS].
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majority consensus of 2013 through 2015, which if accurate, is 
undemocratic.69 Moreover, the recently passed legislation is undemocratic 
because the public majority is consistently and, in fact, increasingly opposed 
to them.70
Before the CLB came out with its decision to reinterpret Article 9, an 
opinion poll conducted by the liberal and second largest national newspaper, 
Asahi, found that 63% of respondents were against Prime Minister Abe’s plan 
for Article 9.71 In addition, an opinion poll conducted by a conservative
newspaper called Nikkei found that its respondents had some reservations 
about the Prime Minister’s plan.72 There were also unique responses against 
the revision, such as the formation of a Tokyo-based organization called 
Women Who Won’t Have Sex With War-mongering Men, and a Japanese man 
who denounced revision by self-immolation in public.73 On top of the 
domestic protests against the Article 9 revision, the Norwegian Nobel 
Committee publicly supported the anti-revision cause by strongly considering 
the Japanese people who conserve Article 9 as recipients of its peace price.74
After the CLB rendered its decision to reinterpret Article 9 silently, a little 
over 50% of respondents from a poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun were in 
favor of Prime Minister Abe’s administration, pursuant to a trend of 
decreasing approval.75
Between the passing of the legislation in the lower and upper house, 
approximately 100,000 to 350,000 student protesters from a student 
organization called Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy 
(“SEALD”) gathered in front of the Japanese Diet to demonstrate against the 
bills.76 Such a movement was unprecedented; the last time that students 
69. Yellen, supra note 49; see Tetsuya, supra note 59.
70. See Akiyama, supra note 53; Jiji, LDP Loses Enthusiasm for Article 9 Revision, 
But Abe Still Determined, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2015/10/06/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-loses-enthusiasm-article-9-revision-abe-
still-determined/#.Vlozl2SrQ0o [https://perma.cc/SKG5-JESL].
71. D.MCN., Keeping the Peace, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/japans-pacifist-constitution [http://perma.cc/
JMP5-JH23].  
72. Id.
73. Jake Adelstein & Angela E. Kubo, Japanese Women Tell Their Men They Have 
to Choose Between Love and War, DAILY BEAST (May 14, 2014), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/14/japanese-women-tell-their-men-they-have-
to-choose-between-love-and-war.html [https://perma.cc/LK6K-ZZ6T] [hereinafter 
Adelstein & Kubo, Women Tell]; Jake Adelstein & Angela E. Kubo, Suicidal Anti-war 
Protest Shocks Japan as It Rethinks Pacifist Constitution, DAILY BEAST (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/30/burning-with-defiance-at-war-in-
japan.html [https://perma.cc/7M6D-NXMK]. 
74. D.MCN., supra note 71; Nobel Peace Prize 2014: PRIO Director’s Speculations,
PEACE RES. INST. OSLO (Oct. 2014), https://www.prio.org/About/PeacePrize/PRIO-
Directors-Speculations-2014/ [https://perma.cc/SA8X-V5GE].
75. Kamiya, supra note 66.
76. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Students Vow to Fight on After Security Bills Pass, U.
WORLD NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.universityworldnews.com/
article.php?story=20150917142421297 [https://perma.cc/6Z5A-A659]; Derek Monroe, 
Japan’s Constitutional Crisis Spells the End of Democracy, RUSSIA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2015), 
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mobilized for a political objective was in the 1970s, when student protesters 
demonstrated against the Japanese involvement in the Vietnam War.77 This 
student protest under SEALD leadership was, historically, the largest 
demonstration in Tokyo.78 In addition, twenty-nine organizations started an 
ambitious campaign to collect twenty million signatures, about a sixth of the 
population of Japan, for a petition that abolishes the recently passed 
legislation.79
Although Prime Minister Abe won another term during this period, a poll 
indicated that the majority of Abe supporters reasoned no one else was more 
competent to take office.80 In fact, Prime Minister Abe’s administration fell 
to an approval rating of 38.5% in September of 2015, which was the lowest 
since he took office in 2012.81 At the same time, Prime Minister Abe’s 
administration reflected a disapproval rating of 41.3%.82 Based on these 
movements and poll numbers, the majority of public sentiment demonstrates 
an objection to Article 9 revision from the period between 2013 and 2015.  
Ultimately, if the public majority opposes the legislation, the government is 
acting antithetically to democratic principles and thus, the legislation is 
unconstitutional.
B. Prior Interpretation of Article 9
1. Recent Deregulation Pattern, Prior Interpretation, and Stare Decisis
In response to the United States’ request to remilitarize in the late 1940s, 
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was placed between a rock and hard place.83
His constituents, who recently went through a devastating and demoralizing 
war, did not want Japan to rearm and militarize, but the United States 
pressured the Prime Minister to rearm and assist in combat.84 The Prime 
Minister, instead, recalled the limitations of Article 9 and established the line 
https://www.rt.com/op-edge/324587-japan-constitutional-crisis-democracy/ [https://
perma.cc/ZQV3-QQAX].
77. Kakuchi, supra note 76; Monroe, supra note 76.
78. See Monroe, supra note 76. 
79. Kyodo, Security Law Protesters to Kick Off 20-Million Signature Petition Drive,
JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/30/national/
groups-protesting-security-laws-set-20-million-signatures-target/#.Vq8M8xgrKfU
[https://perma.cc/PN64-4MTS].
80. See Jiji, Abe Cabinet’s Approval Rating Falls to 38.5% in Latest Opinion Poll,
JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/11/national/
politics-diplomacy/abe-cabinets-approval-rating-falls-38-5-latest-opinion-poll/
#.VlpPkGSrQ0o [https://perma.cc/5X7V-NFMD].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Gabriel Dominguez, Japan’s Security Policy Shift: ‘A Blow to Ties with East 
Asia’, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/japans-security-policy-
shift-a-blow-to-ties-with-east-asia/a-17748656 [https://perma.cc/YBK7-YMTH];
Yoneyuki Sugita, Yoshida Doctrine is a Myth, JAPAN TODAY (Apr. 29, 2014), https://
www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/yoshida-doctrine-is-a-myth [https://
perma.cc/6NTT-PM8D].  
84. See Dominguez, supra note 83; Sugita, supra note 83.
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
KIM NOTE FORMATTED 6/28/2017 5:28 PM
158 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50
of argument, which future government administrations would use, that Japan 
was unable to assist the United States or any ally by sending troops outside 
of Japan.85 This exchange was later referred to as the Yoshida Doctrine, 
which followed the principle of minimal military rights arising from the 
Japanese Constitution.86 Japan adhered to the doctrine throughout the Cold 
War, where the government limited troop deployment, established a near or 
less than 1% of annual Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) military spending 
policy, completely regulated arms transfers, and limited military innovation 
and equipment development.87 For the most of this postwar period, Japan 
upheld their pacifist policy.88
After the Cold War ended, however, Japan adapted its strategy to the 
new international political arena.89 Japan deployed troops outside of Japan 
in the early 1990s to countries such as Cambodia and Iraq for non-military 
peacekeeping operations.90 Japan became more militarily involved by 
passing anti-terrorism laws and laws allowing for the refueling of U.S. 
military ships in Japan in the early 2000s.91 In addition, during the early 
2000s, Prime Minister Koizumi promised President George Bush that Japan 
would send the SDF to Iraq.92 This promise was possible due to the public’s 
anxiety over a successful North Korean missile test, which flew over the 
island of Japan.93 The general Japanese public sentiment of SDF deregulation 
and empowerment during this time was briefly favorable due to the threat 
posed by the North Korean missile test.94 Furthermore, the Japanese Coast 
Guard was empowered, and the Coast Guard even eventually sank a North 
Korean spy ship.95 Prime Minister Abe also allowed for certain arms transfers 
in 2014.96 These recent movements toward deregulation and empowerment 
of the SDF present the context for the latest assault on Article 9, which is the 
85. See Dominguez, supra note 83; Sugita, supra note 83.
86. See Dominguez, supra note 83; Sugita, supra note 83.
87. See Defense Budget, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/japan/budget.htm [https://perma.cc/VA97-PFU5] (last visited Mar. 14, 2017); 
Dominguez, supra note 83; Martin Fackler, Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of 
Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/asia/
japan-ends-half-century-ban-on-weapons-exports.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GD9P-
XADQ]; Sugita, supra note 83; Umeda, supra note 19; Marcus Warren, Japan Sinks 
‘North Korea Spying Ship’, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 24, 2001), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/1366227/Japan-sinks-North-Korea-spying-ship.html
[https://perma.cc/H2P7-WSPK].
88. See Dominguez, supra note 83.
89. See Dominguez, supra note 83; Umeda, supra note 19. 
90. See Dominguez, supra note 83; Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15;
Umeda, supra note 19.
91. See Umeda, supra note 19.
92. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
93. Id.; Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to North Korea, BROOKINGS INST. (Jul. 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/peninsulaquestion_
chapter.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP4F-Z4XU].
94. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
95. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15; Umeda, supra note 19. 
96. See Dominguez, supra note 83. 
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reinterpretation to allow for collective self-defense.97
Thus, the creation of the right to collective self-defense may have been 
a part of the recent patterns of deregulation of the SDF and empowerment of 
SDF capabilities.98  However, the reinterpretation and, by extension, the 
recently passed pieces of legislation, may be unconstitutional because of 
Japan’s version of stare decisis.99 Because the Japanese Supreme Court 
interpreted Article 9 to preclude collective self-defense, the reinterpretation 
by the CLB violates the principle of stare decisis and undermines the stability 
of the law.100 Furthermore, the implementation of the reinterpretation of 
Article 9 is incongruous with the interpretation of past Japanese government 
administrations.101 According to Professor Hasebe, “[a]llowing the use of the 
right of collective self-defense cannot be explained within the framework of 
the basic logic of the past government views of the Constitution.”102 Until 
Prime Minister Abe’s second administration, the Japanese government 
interpreted Article 9 to restrict collective self-defense.103 Although recent 
deregulation patterns have suggested that the trend would reach the issue of 
collective self-defense,104 the patterns themselves cannot justify 
reinterpretation.
2. Response to the Justification for Reinterpretation
Although stare decisis can be overlooked if there is sufficient 
justification, the bases given by Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet are not 
enough.105 The government cited two reasons: the threat of China and the 
fear of abandonment.106
These are similar to the grounds that were given by Prime Minister 
Koizumi to send troops to Iraq.107 The Japanese government perceived a 
significant threat and responded to this threat by expanding their defense 
rights.108 Thus, this type of reinterpretation may be seen as an adaptation to 
current security demands.109 In the early 2000s, legislation that advanced 
97. See id. 
98. See Umeda, supra note 19. 
99. Toshiaki Iimura, et. al., The Binding Nature of Court Decisions in Japan’s Civil 
Law System, STAN. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (June 30, 2015), https://
cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/14-iimura-takabayashi-rademacher/ [https://
perma.cc/72JB-LV33]. The Japanese Supreme Court is the only court in Japan where 
stare decisis applies to its decisions. See also Umeda, supra note 19.
100. Kazue Koishikawa, Japan’s Collective Self-Defense: On Arendt, Sovereignty, and 
Peace, HANNAH ARENDT CTR. FOR POL. & HUMAN. BARD C. (Jan. 17, 2016), http://
www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?p=17301 [https://perma.cc/2TCA-9HJK]; see Yoshida, 
supra note 58.
101. Yoshida, supra note 58.
102. Id.
103. See Adelstein & Kubo, Women Tell, supra note 73. 
104. See id.; Dominguez, supra note 83.
105. See Iimura, supra note 99. 
106. Dominguez, supra note 83.
107. See id.; Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15. 
108. Dominguez, supra note 83; Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
109. Dominguez, supra note 83; Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
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militarization could be passed without public censure.110 The reason was the 
North Korean missile-test in August of 1997, which helped switch public 
opinion almost instantly.111 The public was anxious of a North Korean threat, 
briefly increasing the support of militarization.  In contrast, although Japanese 
public opinion seems to share the government’s anxiety over China, public 
opinion is strongly against the reinterpretation and the recently passed 
legislation.112
Furthermore, the threat of China is less than the threat of Russia.  
According to Masaru Tamamoto, an International Relations professor at 
Meiji Gakuin University, there was little perception of any nuclear threat 
among the Japanese public during the Cold War when the Soviet Union had 
several hundred nuclear missiles pointed at Japan.113 At the same time, the 
Japanese government didn’t feel the need to militarize.114 If China’s threat to 
Japanese security is less than the Soviet Union’s threat to Japanese security, 
notwithstanding China’s growing and provocative military, and if Japan was 
able to live relatively peacefully with the existential Soviet threat without 
militarization, then China’s rise in military and strategic power cannot be the 
basis for reinterpretation and does not, therefore, overcome stare decisis.
The fear of abandonment has been a factor when considering policies 
that affect the relationship between the United States and Japan in the postwar 
period.115 Japanese conservatives are insecure about the relationship and 
believe that they must balance the security duties within the U.S.–Japan 
Security Treaty.116 If Japan fails to do so, the conservatives believe that the 
United States will leave regional security concerns to Japan.117 According to 
Professor Tamamoto, however, the fear of abandonment is irrational because 
the United States is “not ready to retreat from Asia.”118 Furthermore, 
according to Reiji Yoshida, a contributor for The Japan Times, some experts 
argue that the United States needs military bases in Japan in order to take 
advantage of its geostrategic position and have easier access to Asia in 
general.119 Thus, the fear of abandonment is a weak basis for the 
reinterpretation of Article 9.  Historically, Japan has interpreted Article 9 to 
110. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15. 
111. See id.
112. Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, But Limited Harm to 
America’s Image, PEW RES. CTR. (July. 14, 2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/
chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/ [https://perma.cc/ZS5A-FEPD]; see Jiji, supra 
note 80. 
113. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
114. See id. 
115. See id.; Joseph A. Bosco, Entrapment and Abandonment in Asia, NAT’L INT. (July 
8, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/entrapment-abandonment-asia-8697
[https://perma.cc/BB3F-YMKW].
116. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
117. See id. 
118. See id.
119. See id.; Reiji Yoshida, Basics of The U.S. Military Presence, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 
25, 2008), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/03/25/reference/basics-of-the-u-s-
military-presence/#.Vq_UvRgrLUo [https://perma.cc/4735-UJ3H].
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renounce collective self-defense, so the principle of stare decisis suggests that 
the recently passed legislation cannot allow for the opposite conclusion to be 
reached.
C. Consequences of the Article 9 Revision
When the legislation is enacted, Japan will face the world with the ability 
to deploy combat troops outside of Japan when the conflict is indirectly 
related to Japan and is directly related to a close ally.120 This Note will next 
examine the political and economic consequences of this legislation.
1. Political Consequences
Achieving heightened national security through militarization is a 
central aspect of Japanese conservatives’ vision of a normal Japan.121
According to Professor Tamamoto, Japanese conservatives do not think about 
long-term international strategy and instead focus narrowly on short-term 
policy objectives.122 Moreover, the Japanese government is faithfully 
following U.S. requests dating from the 1990s by balancing security duties 
enumerated in the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty.123
a. Expanded SDF Capabilities in Regional Security
Recently, since the United States reduced its military budget for East 
Asian security and the fear of China’s military pursuits are growing, President 
Obama requested the Japanese SDF to assume a bigger role in security over 
East Asia.124 In addition, the Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation 
(“the Guidelines”) sets new parameters for joint operations between the 
United States and Japan in the event that Japan’s security is threatened.125
The Guidelines, however, do not provide much detail about joint exercises 
and other activities around the region, indicating the limitations to exercising 
its right to collective self-defense outside of national security concerns.126
This ambiguity in joint coordination outside of a threatened Japan 
120. See Jonathan Soble, Japan Moves to Allow Military Combat for First Time in 70 
Years, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/world/asia/
japans-lower-house-passes-bills-giving-military-freer-hand-to-fight.html [https://
perma.cc/Y67X-LGA6].
121. See id.
122. See id.; Yoshida, supra note 119.
123. Borah, supra note 3; Jeffery W. Hornung, U.S.-Japan: A Pacific Alliance 
Transformed, DIPLOMAT (May 4, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/u-s-japan-a-
pacific-alliance-transformed/ [https://perma.cc/882P-UAVW]; see Umeda, supra note 19.
124. See Hornung, supra note 123; see also Lionel Pierre Fatton, Japan’s New Defense 
Posture, DIPLOMAT (July 10, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/japans-new-defense-
posture/ [https://perma.cc/GZ36-PVQG]; James L. Schoff, Navigating a New U.S.-Japan 
Defense Technology Frontier, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/10/navigating-new-u.s.-japan-defense-
technology-frontier [https://perma.cc/LPX4-9VDJ].
125. Yuki Tatsumi, 4 Takeaways from the New US-Japan Defense Guidelines,
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 29, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/4-takeaways-from-the-new-
us-japan-defense-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/3LB5-PYPW].  
126. See id.
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demonstrates the limitation of the Japanese government’s understanding of 
the revised Article 9.127 In the end, when Japan carries out a U.S. request to 
militarize, it advances the Japanese conservatives’ vision of a “normal 
Japan.”128
Furthermore, although militarization is unpopular and the Japanese 
government has stated that the right to collective self-defense is very limited, 
as demonstrated by the ambiguities left for future negotiations in the 
Guidelines, Japan is capable of slowly expanding the role of the SDF in 
regional security.129 This slow expansion is likely because the Guidelines 
have already outlined such an expanded function for the SDF, albeit 
ambiguously, and the United States has constantly pushed for Japanese 
militarization and their wider role in regional security.130 This idea is 
supported by the Japanese adherence to U.S. policy in East Asian and 
Southeast Asian security in the postwar period, the last twenty of which 
broadened the scope of SDF capabilities in spite of the unpopularity of 
militarization.131 If Japan does expand SDF roles, it is possible that 
threatened countries will use the enhanced role of the Japanese SDF within 
the region as justification for increases in military expenditure.132
Outside of the responses from other countries, another consequence of 
the Article 9 reinterpretation is that the right to collective self-defense can be 
an ever-expanding term.133 Because the limitations to collective self-defense 
are vague, critics argue that conservative hawks could use the right whenever 
they please “under the guise of security.”134 Prime Minister Abe informally 
stated that sending the SDF to the Strait of Hormuz for a minesweeping 
operation under the auspices of the United Nations is a proper example of 
Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense.135 In such a scenario, he 
believes that there is a clear threat to Japan’s security because 80% of the 
tankers that supply domestic Japanese oil consumption travel through that 
strait.136 If such a circumstance calls for collective self-defense, then the 
parameters of such a right seem to be wide and open to abuse, further raising 
the risk of response from threatened countries.
b. Scenario Like the Cold War
If the legislation is enacted, threatened countries will likely respond, 
127. See id. 
128. See Borah, supra note 3; Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
129. See SDF’s Expanding Missions, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/10/18/editorials/sdfs-expanding-missions/
#.WLdebGQrK8U [https://perma.cc/K6C3-UBMW]; Tatsumi, supra note 125.
130. See SDF’s Expanding Missions, supra note 129; Tatsumi, supra note 125; Umeda, 
supra note 19.
131. See Kato, supra note 2; Umeda, supra note 19. 
132. See Borah, supra note 3; Tamamoto, Post Containment, supra note 33; Umeda, 
supra note 19; Yellen, supra note 49. 
133. Dominguez, supra note 83; see Fatton, supra note 124.
134. See Dominguez, supra note 83. 
135. See Fatton, supra note 124.
136. See id. 
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perhaps in contradiction to conservatives’ goal of heightened national 
security.137 According to Professor Tamamoto, issues of national security are 
inherently about relations with other countries.138 Especially in the context 
where historical memory of Japanese aggression in the first-half of the 20th 
century still exists in the East Asian and Southeast Asian regions, threatened 
countries will likely respond to the legislation with tense diplomatic 
relations.139 Also, because the Guidelines call for joint cooperation between 
the Japanese and U.S. military-industrial complexes, the Japanese defense 
industry will likely receive business opportunities for joint-defense projects 
and other international enterprises.140 As a result, Japan should be able to 
develop their military-grade equipment through international market forces 
(other countries’ willingness to purchase their weaponry or equipment) and 
state-to-state cooperation (joint public enterprises that would provide 
lucrative defense contracts or subsidies for research and development).141
With the advancement of military technology and equipment, Japan will 
be able to respond to potentially harsh reactions from threatened countries 
with more cost-effective military expenditure and competitive military 
equipment.142 According to James Schoff, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, such a defense strategy between Japan 
and the United States can foster suspicion by threatened countries and cause 
a spiral of defense spending similar to the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.143  Although he points out that different outcomes are 
possible, Mr. Schoff concludes that the spiral outcome would squander 
political opportunities and economic resources in a significant way.144 It is 
possible that joint military cooperation in military technology and redefining 
military roles within the security forces of Pax Americana would ensure such 
a leap in military might that countries like China would not see such defense 
strategy as an existential threat, but as an inefficient and costly invitation to 
keep up with Pax Americana’s defense expenditure.145 This scenario, 
however, may not be consistent with reality.
China has been a growing concern for not only the United States, but 
also the Japanese public.146 At the same time, the United States and Japan 
137. Borah, supra note 3; see Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
138. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
139. See id.; Borah, supra note 3; Tamamoto, Post Containment, supra note 33. 
140. See Tatsumi, supra note 125.  Because Japan has reformed their regulation over 
arms transfers in the international community, Japan is looking forward to selling military 
equipment to other nations.  Id.; see also Schoff, supra note 124.
141. See Schoff, supra note 124.
142. See Borah, supra note 3; Tatsumi, supra note 125.
143. See Schoff, supra note 124.  Defense spending for the United States during the 
1980s soared to 30% of annual GDP, translating to over $2 trillion.  Id.; see Tatsumi, supra 
note 125.
144. See Schoff, supra note 124. 
145. See id.
146. See Grace Cheng, China’s Response to a Post-Pacifist Japan, E-INT’L REL. (Sept. 
14, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/14/chinas-response-to-a-post-pacificist-japan/
[https://perma.cc/CMV8-MXXX].
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have both become threats to China’s political interests.147 China has 
particularly criticized Japanese effacement of history, the Yasakuni Shrine 
visits, and the purchase of islands near Japan.148 Simultaneously, China and 
Japan have set up exclusive economic zones in maritime territory that overlap 
each other, causing further political dispute and anxiety.149 With the 
increasing tension between Japan and China, China has increased their 
provocations against Japan, such as using or patrolling Japan’s economic 
zones.150 Although China acknowledges that stabilizing their relationship is 
more desirable than the current status quo, China will likely continue its 
robust military expenditure in conjunction with security adaptations that will
counter the fruits resulting from the Guidelines.151 Diplomacy between the 
two countries is preferable, but such an outcome may not happen in the near 
future considering the problems within their relationship are so deep, 
complex, and hard to resolve.152 China will likely not pass up the invitation 
to militarize and continue its political aims, which will provoke Japan as 
Japan provokes China.
Even if the Japan–U.S. security forces are far superior in a qualitative 
sense compared to pre-Guidelines coordination, Mr. Schoff does not seem to 
indicate that China would ease its provocations or its military expenditure as 
a result.153 Japan in such a scenario is arguably less secure.  This is because 
a Japan with enhanced military capabilities may pursue an aggressive course 
of action as a response to further provocations, which it previously would not 
have been able to execute if under similar circumstances.  With increased 
confidence in their military might, a more capable Japan may mean a Japan 
that is more active as it is able to perform wider functions in regional security, 
while becoming more sensitive to Chinese aggression.  Moreover, an 
emergency situation like a military encounter or other defense concerns, 
according to Robin Sakoda, a Partner at Armitage International, L.C., is 
more-than-likely to be encountered in the near future.154 If an emergency 
situation is to arise, then a Japan with enhanced military capabilities will 
provoke more instability because of its ability to respond militarily to the 
threat.
147. See id. 
148. See id.; see also Barney Henderson, Why Do Japan and China Have Such A Frosty 
Relationship?, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/china/11221248/Why-do-Japan-and-China-have-such-a-frosty-
relationship.html [https://perma.cc/SL34-4HFM].
149. See Cheng, supra note 146.
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
152. Henderson, supra note 148.
153. See Schoff, supra note 124.
154. See Sakoda, supra note 44.
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2. Economic Consequences
a. Japan’s Economic Development Model
The enactment of the legislation, which will lead to a greater presence of 
Japanese SDF in the South Asian and Southeast Asian regions, will arguably 
undermine Japan’s most undervalued export: a feasible economic 
development model, which strongly emphasizes non-military over military 
spending.155 In the late 20th century, Southeast Asian countries bought into 
the design and started to use the Japanese economic model.156 In contrast to 
the economic integration patterns of the European Union (“EU”) where the 
European Commission (“EC”) headed the endeavor as the institutional 
political body of the EU, the economic integration pattern of the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) occurred without any 
institutionalization of a political body.157 The members of ASEAN were able 
to economically integrate and become interdependent primarily due to market 
forces.158 This development occurred without Japan as the institutional 
political leader despite ASEAN member’s implementation of the Japanese 
economic development model.159
Moreover, this arrangement was possible because of the security 
guarantee afforded by the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and the American 
presence in the region, which enabled continued regional East Asian security 
by the United States.  This security incentivized countries to buy into the 
Japanese model, which emphasized less military spending.160 In addition, 
because South-Asian and Southeast-Asian countries see the United States 
relationship as a check on Japan’s aggressive impulses, the arrangement 
allows for Japan to legitimize its informal economic leadership and 
effectively attract countries that would not have been attracted to its economic 
model without the United States’ connection to Japan.161 If the United States 
decides to provide less military support for regional security and uses the 
Japanese SDF to fill the space instead, which seems to be the current U.S. 
strategy, this would lessen regional economic integration.162 With a
155. See Tamamoto, Post Containment, supra note 33.  This economic development 
model was derived from the Yoshida Doctrine, which put economic development as the 
primary focus of government. Such a model was produced to not only rehabilitate the 
Japanese economy, but to also take advantage of Pax Americana in East Asia.  Id.; see 
also Nayana Das, Japan’s ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ as It Stands Today, UN, YOU KNOW?!, (July
22, 2015), https://unyouknow.org/2015/07/22/japans-yoshida-doctrine-as-it-stands-today/
[https://perma.cc/7HB7-NFKX] (calling the Japanese economic development model the 
“Asian Model of Development”).
156. See Hornung, supra note 123.
157. See Tamamoto, Post Containment, supra note 33.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The U.S. 7th Fleet is the underlying component of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty 
and, thus, regional security.  The 7th Fleet brings regional security by integrating the SDF 
and other allied Asian military forces and coordinating exercises, projects, and obligations 
arising from treaties.  See id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; Borah, supra note 3; Hornung, supra note 123.
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decreased American troop presence and the increased presence of Japanese 
SDF within the region, the incentive to follow the Japanese model—which is 
partly about lessening military expenditure—will be undermined for those 
countries already committed like the members of ASEAN.163 Furthermore, 
countries that have not hopped on board will less likely buy into the Japanese 
economic development model as the regional threat perception of Japan 
grows.
b. Impact of Military Waste and Policy Recommendation for the United 
States
As mentioned previously, through the recently passed legislation and 
thus the Guidelines agreement, Japan will be in joint coordination for the sale 
and development of military weapons and equipment.164 The Japanese 
government may have been persuaded to pursue this objective because of, 
among other considerations, the economic opportunities arising from 
lucrative defense contracts and newly opened export markets.  If Japan was 
concerned about economic opportunities and both the United States and Japan 
desire regional security, the Guidelines will likely not be the remedy.  In fact, 
because of the security concerns arising from the agreement, the Guidelines 
may undermine not only regional security, but also the fruits from its 
economic opportunities.165 If a spiral of military spending occurs between 
competing countries, the financial benefits arising from the economic 
opportunities will likely be squandered on wasteful military expenditure.166
Instead of the legislation and Guidelines, the United States should 
incentivize Japan and the rest of the East Asian and Southeast Asian region 
to decrease military spending.167 The United States can implement a sizeable 
reduction in its ground forces, nullifying the ability to invade and occupy 
other countries.168  If countries undertake such a consideration, the U.S.
military will look like a defensive force, still having the ability to use its air 
force and navy and thus being able to defend itself from invading forces.169
The United States, then, can use the extra money saved from significantly 
reducing the budget of the Army to set a pattern.170 It can encourage countries 
like Japan and other Asian countries to follow the United States’ lead by 
conditioning this newly created fund on reducing troop numbers.171
If the United States undertakes such an enterprise, Japan will likely 
follow suit not only because the United States has a huge political force in 
Japanese government, but because Japan’s economic desires would be 
satisfied.  In addition, Japanese security concerns will not be affected by the 
163. See Tamamoto, Post Containment, supra note 33.
164. See Schoff, supra note 124.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Tamamoto, Post Containment, supra note 33.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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U.S. plan because the foundation of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, and thus 
regional security concerns, is the U.S. 7th Fleet, which the Japanese SDF 
Navy and Air Force are closely integrated and a part of.172 Conveniently, the 
SDF Army is mostly left out of this close integration, making the reduction 
of ground troops an easier task in the face of sophisticated joint military 
coordination.173 According to Professor Tamamoto, the SDF Army consumes 
about half of Japan’s military budget.174  Thus, the extra funds arising from 
the reduction in ground troops and U.S. financial aid are powerful incentives 
for the Japanese government, especially if they are concerned with economic 
opportunities.
Conclusion
The recently passed legislation should be unconstitutional because of
democratic principle and prior interpretation of Article 9.  The consequences 
of the enactment of such legislation will arguably undermine Japanese 
national security and regional economic integration.  As we have seen, 
because the United States has the power to encourage Japan’s path to either 
militarize or continue its pacifism, it is in the best interest of both the United 
States and Japan to choose the latter.175 The United States will benefit in the 
long-term because a pacified East Asia will help the United States avoid 
military and diplomatic costs over time.176 Although Japan will likely not go 
to war, negative consequences can result, which could hurt future 
opportunities for negotiations and diplomacy.
The scars of history are still associated with Japan’s past, which 
undermine hopes of an organic cooling period in the near future.  This is 
especially true as recent actions by Japan, like the comfort women issue and 
the Yasakuni Shine visits, are seen as incendiary by East Asian and Southeast 
Asian countries.  Japan must stop its passive aggression and, after the 
enactments of the legislation, prevent future active aggression.177  Although 
one may attempt to view current Japanese passive aggression as a response 
to passive aggressive moves by China, this perspective may be incorrect.  In 
a cost-benefit analysis, the political costs, like increasing tension with 
regional neighbors, seem to outweigh any benefit arising from such 
incendiary actions if the actions are only a response to Chinese passive 
aggression.
Moreover, Japanese conservatives must understand that security 
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Tamamoto, U.S.-Japan Relations, supra note 15.
176. See id.
177. See S.J. Friedman, Why ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Doesn’t Shut Book on Japan’s 
Wartime Sex Slavery, CNN (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/30/opinions/
japan-korea-china-comfort-women/ [https://perma.cc/3THS-9VN5]; Madison Park, 
Yasukuni Shrine Visits: Japan Honoring The Dead Or Insulting The Neighbors?, CNN 
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/21/world/asia/yasukuni-japan/ [https://
perma.cc/52TQ-ZEDP].
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concerns are related to historical memory.  In fact, Japanese security is 
dependent upon, among others, the resolution of its history.  If Japan wants 
to take a step towards resolving its security issues, the government should 
first acknowledge that there is a problem.  The Japanese government should 
then try reconciling its shared history with its neighbors.  Japan cannot 
continue to ignore the past as it has kept pace with the present.  To the pain 
of Japanese conservatives, the past haunts and throws mud on the luster of 
Japanese nationalism.178 As we move forward, Japan must resist these 
conservatives and continue to overcome its challenges against pacifism.
178. See TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA & KAZUHIKO TOGO, EAST ASIA’S HAUNTED PRESENT:
HISTORICAL MEMORIES AND RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM 183 (2008).
